Book Review

The War Against Rommel’s Supply Lines

Alan J. Levine

Four Stars out of Five

This is a very good book providing an in-depth analysis into the battle raging against the umbilical cord tying the Axis forces in North Africa to their base in Italy. In my opinion, no student of the war in the Mediterranean will be able to ignore it.

The book covers the whole of the supply struggle waged in the Mediterranean, but focuses on the period following the Alamein battles and the invasion of North Africa by US and British forces, when it became imperative for Allied planners to prevent a permanent lodging of Axis forces in Tunisia, to the surrender of Axis forces in May 1943. Five out of six chapters are devoted to this effort, while the first chapter provides a concise, yet highly informative and well-researched summary of what went on during 1940-42.

The focus chapters deal with the planning of the invasion of French North Africa, and in particular the role and establishment of 12^th Air Force. The author describes well the troubles this formation went through when it was first established, and the very difficult command arrangements at the start of the campaign in Tunisia. The following chapters discuss the invasion, the attack against the build-up of Axis forces in Tunisia, which is rightly described in a very critical manner, the re-organisation of the forces engaged in the logistical battle from January 1943 onwards, and their contribution to the eventual victory. The book gives time to both US and British forces engaged in the battle, and is quite (and justly) complimentary to the Italian effort in keeping the Axis forces in Tunisia supplied.

The author manages well to weave a narrative integrating theatre strategy and individual actions, although at times the information packed into single sentences or paragraphs can become overwhelming. I am also not convinced about the need for as much detail as is sometimes provided and editing could maybe have parsed the text a bit more of unnecessary detail.

The book is very well-researched, going through archival material such as unit records of air formations engaged in the battle, or patrol reports of submarines, and it makes very good use of official histories, of both sides. This is a particularly outstanding feature of the book – where possible, the author made the effort of trying to verify claims made by Allied forces against air and sea targets, by checking the Axis records. While this is no doubt a thankless task, and often a wild goose chase, it is one that cannot be lauded enough. The author has also gone to good length in providing a background on the technical capabilities of the Allied weapons available for the task, highlighting the planes and submarines in particular.

The book sports an index, an extensive literature list, and a good set of endnotes – in other words, it is a serious research work. What is missing is a list of maps, although since there are only two, so maybe that was not considered necessary. Which leads me to: sufficient in number and detail maps are missing, so I recommend having an Atlas of WW2 handy while reading it, unless you have a North Africa map in your head. The selection of pictures is appropriate to the topic, and the quality is acceptable, especially considering the price. What I really would have liked to see are diagrams of air-sea attack formations. These are described verbally, but a picture would help very much in understanding the roles of the various planes engaging shipping targets. But that is really the only major gripe I can think of.

Thanks go to Stackpole for not only publishing a book that is clearly dealing with a somewhat esoteric topic (why bother with logistics - when you could have the umpteenth 750-page colour book about Waffen SS-Tigers?), but making the effort to create a very attractive presentation, and pricing it very reasonably. Highly recommended.

Major commands and commanders

Here is a list of the major (above divisional level) ground force commands, and who was in charge of them on 18 November 41.

Axis

• Axis forces in Africa - Ettore Bastico
• Panzergruppe Afrika - Erwin Rommel
• Deutsches Afrika Korps - Ludwig Cruewell
• Corpo Armata di Manovra - Gastone Gambarra
• XXI. Corpo Armata - Enea Navarrini

Commonwealth

• Commonwealth Middle East - Sir Claude Achinleck
• 8th Army - Sir Alan Cunningham
• XXX Corps - Willoughbie Norrie
• XIII Corps - Reade Godwin-Austen
• Tobruk - Ronald Scobie

The multinational battle

Crusader was unusual in that it brought together a vast number of nationalities in a battle where almost none of them had anything to do with the place they fought over in the first instance. A total of three nationalities on the Axis side, and another 10 on the Allied side.

If anybody has further info on No. 272 Squadron (Blenheims) which seems to have contained a good number of Belgiums, please email me.

On the Axis side:

Germans (15th, 21st Panzer, Div. z.b.V. Afrika/90th Light)
Italians (Armoured Div. Ariete, Mot. Div. Trieste, Trento, Inf. Div. Bologna, Brescia, Pavia, Sabratha, Savona)
Libyans (native troops, auxiliaries)

On the Commonwealth side (counting formations at least battalion size or large naval units from destroyer or up):

Divisions:
British (1st, 7th Armoured, 70th)
Indian (4th)
South African (1st, 2nd)
New Zealand

Brigades:
British (22nd Guards, 1st, 32nd Army Tank)
Polish (Carpathian)

Battalions:
Australian (2/13)
Czechoslovak

Air Squadrons:
British
South African
Rhodesian (No. 237 Squadron, engaged in tactical recce)
French (Groupe de Bombardement 'Lorraine')

Naval Units:
British
Australian (Cruiser HMAS Hobart, Destroyers HMAS Nestor, Nizam, and Napier, Sloops HMAS Parramatta, Yarra)
Dutch (Destroyer HrMS Isaac Sweers, submarines)
Polish (submarine)

So how many men were lost in the battle?

There are some interesting discrepancies here:
Numbers from the PAA KTB, shortly after the battle:

German losses (Officers/Other Ranks - Share of total strength on 18/11/41)
KIA 104/1,032 (7%/7%)
WIA 144/3,339 (8.5%/7%)
MIA 201/9,940 (10.5%/20%) (of these 4,500 Bardia/Halfaya)
Total 449/14,311 (14,760)

Ital. losses (Off/OR - Share total strength on 18/11/41)
KIA 85/951 (3%/1.5%)
WIA 155/1.967 (4%/3%)
MIA 1.172/17.382 (34%/30%) (of these 8,000 Bardia/Halfaya)
Total 1,412/20,300 (21,712)

Axis total: 1,816/35,060 (36,876)

Material (German/Ital.- Share total strength on 18/11/41)
Tanks 220/120 (85%/80%)
Guns 42/181 (40%/48%)
Aircraft 170/105 (160%/150%)

PAA KTB assumes Commonwealth losses as this:

10.000 KIA/WIA
12.000 POW
1.623 armoured vehicles (tanks/AC/carriers)
2.500 motor vehicles
329 Aircraft

The brit. official history which is based on German/Italian records, and of course the Commonwealth unit records, gives the following losses to mid January, without Rommel's counter offensive.

Total strength/KIA/WIA/MIA/Total/Share of strength 18/11/41
German 65,000/1,100/3,400/10,100/14,600/22%
Ital. 54,000/1,200/2,700/19,800/23,700/43%
Axis total 119,000/2,300/6,100/29,900/38,300/32% (13,800 of these MIA
inBardia/Halfaya)

Brit. 118,000/2,900/7,300/7,500/17,700/15%

The counter offensive at end Jan. was no big deal for either side interms of losses, apart from the ca. 1,000 POW of 7th Indian Brigade,which was encircled east of Benghazi, but able to break out, but this must account for most of the discrepancy in the POW numbers of the Commonwealth forces.

Now for the real puzzle: Italian numbers for Italian losses are much higher than either the British or German numbers:

Ital. losses from Italian Official History 15/11/41 to 15/1/42
Officers/NCO/OR/Libyans/Total:
1,945/2,674/34,974/2,674/42,185
Material:
Autom. support weapons: 3.200
Mortars 89x81mm/307x45mm
Tanks 63 medium/187 light (all light tanks lost)
Armoured Cars 25
Anti-Aircraft guns 320
Guns all calibres 584
Motor vehicles 5.000

The Italian official history also gives Axis strength as higher than the British OH:

Germans 70,000
Italians 100,000 (they count everyone including chaps in Libya, is my guess)

As you can see there are significant discrepancies in the numbers, and the KTB of PAA has to be seen as the absolute lowest for the Axis losses. It is likely that the most relevant number is the one from the British official history.

If anyone has further insight, please contact me.

Supply statistics for North Africa

These are calculations I have done based on data in Dati Statistici Vol. I 2a Edizione USMMM Roma 1972.

Arrival rates of all military supplies in NA, Italian navy data, all units, volume of military supplies received in 1,000 tons:

Jul 41 - 81% (61.5kt)

Aug 41 - 87% (75.6kt)

Sep 41 - 79% (66.3kt)

Oct 41 - 76% (56.2kt)

Nov 41 - 26% (16.2kt)

Dec 41 - 78% (29.7kt)

Jan 42 - 100% (60.5kt)

Feb 42 - 100% (56.8kt)

Mar 42 - 80% (38.7kt)

Apr 42 - 99% (142.0kt)

May 42 - 92% (76.6kt)

Jun 42 - 79% (30.1kt)

Jul 42 - 92% (74.4kt)

Aug 42 - 66% (49.0kt)

Sep 42 - 81% (77.3kt)

Oct 42 - 50% (33.9kt)

Nov 42 - 74% (60.3kt)

Note that my guess is that non-arrived does not necessarily mean sunk, since it could also include convoys that departed but had to turn back (e.g. Convoy "C" on 24 November 41).

The figures very clearly show the extent of the autumn supply crisis, which almost cut off supplies to North Africa at the very moment the fighting reached the highest pitch of intensity of all year.

Combat Report 15th Rifle Brigade - 28 Dec 41

15th Rifle Brigade

?? January 1942

Battle Report

About the attack and pursuit against the English 22nd Armoured Brigade at Uadi Faregh on 28 December 1941

At 01.30 hours during the night 27 to 28 December 1941 the following radio transmission for 28 December arrived from D.A.K. at the reinforced 15th Rifle Brigade (Rifle Regiment 115, Regiment 200 minus MG Battalion 2, Artillery Regiment 33 minus one light battalion, two companies tank hunter battalion 33, armoured pioneer battalion 33), which was tasked with defence towards the south and south-east in the area Rugbet el Nagina (about 30 km south of Agedabia): „Group Cruewell destroys 28 December enemy group east of 165. It attacks: Geissler with subordinated elements 08.30 hours direction 165, Mot. Corps 09.00 hours direction 164 left 1. 21. Panzer-Division 07.00 hours from area south-east Agedabia direction south, to be able to take effect at 10.00 hours at 164 left 2. Vaerst to rest at 168 for the moment. Will, when attack of northern group takes effect, depending on development of the situation, attack north or north-east. Corps CP from 08.45 hours with Mot. Corps, 163 right 1.5. Stuka mission foreseen; lots of air recognition panels and flares.”
During the 27 December Group Vaerst, standing at the eastern limits of Alem el Turch, had stopped an enemy group which intended to bypass the Agedabia position to the south with significant forces. This enemy grouping was to be destroyed in a concentric attack in the area Chor es-Sufan, before it could attempt further enveloping advance north or south.
For Battle Group Geissler the determination of the direction of the attack was difficult at first, since the Italians did not stand in the location relative to the battle group that was apparently assumed by the Corps. It was in any case necessary (and this was probably in the intent of the higher leadership) for Group Geissler to close up to the Italians as quickly as possible, if the planned concentric attack was to succeed. This demand was determining the choice of the direction of the initial attack.
At 02.30 hours the following orders for the 28 December were given to the subordinated units by phone:
“Enemy situation changed, strong enemy group probably in the area Chor es-Sufan. 07.30 hours stand-to for attack direction south-east inside strongpoints in a way that at any moment an attack, with battalions of S.R.115 in column, can be started.
Regiment 200 (minus M.G.-Btl.2) and Pz. Pi-Btl. 33 07.00 hours ready for move to start behind the S.R.115 already standing-to.
Artillery with elements surveillance direction south-east, with mass from 07.50 hours ready for immediate start behind riflemen.
Both Pz.Jg.Kp.33 ready for departure at 07.30 hours.
Commanders and Commanding Officers of the Pz.Jg.Kp. at 06.30 hours to the Brigade CP. Commander Regiment 200 to bring along radioset. One officer patrol from Pz.Pi.Btl.33 at 06.15 to Brigade CP.
The patrol from the Pz.Pi.Btl.33 which was set off at 06.30 hours has the task to reconnoitre at first in an easterly direction against the enemy suspected there, and to constantly report its observations. If no enemy forces are observed to the east, it has to move south-east. A report about the first enemy contact is of particular importance to the Brigade CO in this situation.
Following the setting off of the reconnaissance, a section consisting of an Ordonnanz officer, an interpreter, and a radio set is set off to the Italian Mot. Corps to establish a connection, especially to co-ordinate the movements of the two formations in time for the attack that is about to proceed. Task:
1.) Establish when, and in which direction, the Italians will start. Which enemy reports are available at the Mot. Corps?
2.) Information about own intent. First report about start and movement direction of the Italians is of particular importance!
During the O-Group at 06.30 hours all commanders are informed about the intent of the Corps, as far as it can be ascertained from the radio order. In addition to the already issued pre-orientation by phone it is added:
“Order of battle for the attack in an at first expected easterly direction: S.R.115 (battalions in column), with them Brigade staff. Right rearwards Regiment 200 with K.B.15 and Pz.Pi.-Bt.33. Behind the rifle regiment the artillery.
Tank hunters protect southern flank, with one company each with S.R.115 and Regiment 200.
A change of the direction of the attack can be expected at any moment after contact is established with the Italians, or on the basis of reports of the officer patrol sent eastwards. Start time foreseen is 08.30 hours. Preparation for defence has to be assured until the start.”
While all units get ready to start, the first messages from the patrol arrive; he has first recognised a large collection of vehicles to the east, which are later identified as Italian. Without further enemy reports, or awaiting the first report of the establishment of contact with the Mot. Corps, start in direction east is ordered at 08.30 hours. At 08.30 hours the Brigade staff drives ahead to S.R.115 which is forming up to start.
The battle group has to surmount some terrain difficulties at first. Reports are sent to Corps that some vehicles get stuck in deep sand. The S.R.115 has particular difficulties with its trucks, only by using prime movers is it possible to slowly cross the difficult sand dunes.
At 09.10 hours visual connection to the Italians is established. The returning liaison officer reports that the Italians did start on the attack in the direction south-east at 09.00 hours, but on foot. At first no forward movement could be recognised.
At 09.14 Corps orders to direct the march south-east and to keep contact to the Italians. A report is made to Corps that contact to the Italians by visual and officer is made and has been established.
At 09.30 combat sounds, in particular strong artillery fire, apparently at Group Vaerst can be heard in the south. The Corps is informed of this.
In the meantime at 09.35 hours the point of the battle group has reached an escarpment offereing a good overview towards south and south-east. At a distance of about 8 to 10 km, from a very good observation position and in clear sight conditions large vehicle agglomerations in an east-west direction are observed in a depression. Furthest to the west about 40 tanks are recognised, also on the northern flank several armoured cars, as well as single tanks, probably to secure to the north.
The opponent appears to no use – albeit too late this time – combat reconnaissance. Single armoured cars are clearly recognisable, approaching the northern escarpment in fast move. The Corps is informed about the recognised enemy. After at 10.00 hours the order has been received from Corps: “Main task to gain ground to south-east, choose best direction after reconnaissance.” and at 10.10 hours a Stuka attack has targeted the centre of the large enemy column, Brigade orders renewed start in direction south-east against the right flank of the enemy in the depression.
The mass of S.R.115 has by now, following surmounting of the terrain difficulties, closed up, and forms up to attack. The first battalion is moved up to the right of the second battalion. About 20 enemy tanks leave the main column at around 10.20 hours and partially move west, with individual tanks also moving north-west and north. The rifle regiment immediately deploys AT guns to cover the regrouping and the change of face into a south-easterly direction. The mass of the tanks recognised in the western part of the depression move ahead south-west at around 10.40 hours. The vehicle columns remain in the original place for the moment.
Regiment 200 receives the order from the Brigade CO, to protect the right flank to follow to the right rear of the attack of S.R.115.
The use of the Pz.Jg.-Kp. Is of particular importance in the attack about to happen, since armoured cars and single tanks are trying at times to move against the battle group from the column. The Pz.Jg.-Kp. subordinated to Regiment 200 has the task to take over tank protection in the right flank.
Following a quick check with the artillery commander, to the rear of the S.R.115, which is advancing with both battalions up front at around 11.00 hours, a heavy battery is deployed to combat the enemy column. The well-placed own fire is very quickly answered by two enemy batteries from the south. The light battalion continues at first to follow behind S.R.115, but then also intervenes in the combat. Unfortunately an effective combating of the numerous and valuable enemy targets is not possible because of a lack of ammunition. Nevertheless the enemy column is at least brought into considerable shock. The sudden appearance of German and Italian troops on the right flank must have completely surprised the enemy.
Because of the relatively strong number of enemy tanks protecting the column the attack can now only be pushed ahead by fire and movement of the AT weapons. The formations of the Mot. Corps are also only slowly gaining ground on foot, leaving the battle group therefore already far ahead.
Since the appearance of Group Vaerst from the south-west can be expected at any moment, the battle group is transmitting to the push group the own location and the most forward line reached, to avoid friendly fire.
After the repulse of some enemy armoured cars which reached close to the most forward elements of S.R.115 by a very dashingly advancing AT gun, the attack, which was delayed for a time due to numerous enemy tanks, is again continued. At 11.50 hours a report about the new start is sent to the D.A.K.
The Brigade receives information at this time that at 12.00 hours Group Vaerst will start the attack from a south-westerly direction. At the same time the radio order is received from the corps: “The decision of the engagement which has to be forced today depends on quick, energetic grappling.”
The enemy artillery, which apparently had not yet recognised the danger threatening from the south-west continues for the time to fire on the battle group, especially on the battery positions, with several batteries. A report is made to D.A.K. that the attack is proceeding, but that about 25 tanks are standing in the south, which delay for the time being a quick move of the battle group, which does not have any tanks. For a time it looks as if the enemy tanks want to turn for an attack north against the battle group. They seem to be unclear about which enemy they should attack, who is the more dangerous opponent for them.
From Brigade the second tank hunter company is made available to S.R.115, which has already deployed its own tank hunters and one tank hunter company ahead of its front, especially to combat the enemy tanks ahead of the right wing. Fire is opened again and again on the closest enemy tanks; local evasive movements are the consequence. Only shortly after 12.00 hours does the mass of the enemy tanks clearly make front to the south-west.
Group Vaerst, which has by now started, can be observed well for the moment from the own height. At around 12.50 hours tank combat ignites there. The Group Vaerst fights over a height with a numerically superior enemy. The artillery of Group Geissler now primarily engages the enemy tanks turning south-west against Group Vaerst, and the artillery protected by them. One heavy battery is silenced.
For the battle group the moment to engage more closely has now arrived. S.R.115 has come across two larger terrain heights secured by infantry forces and single tanks. Against these a planned attack is now ordered. The light artillery battalion is ordered to closely co-operate with the rifle regiment; forward observation officers rush ahead to the battalions. The preparation of the attack against this enemy is reported to the D.A.K. at 12.55 hours. An officer patrol in the southern strip of the 2nd battalion (placed left) is chasing off the enemy armoured cars securing the left height. AT guns of the tank hunters and AT guns of the regiment compete with each other in the combat against the enemy tanks providing security; ahead of the whole front several kills are achieved.
The 21. Pz.Div. has by now advanced well on the left wing of the attack towards the south, and has, in particular with its artillery, intervened effectively in the fight from the north-east. In the enemy column furthest east movement has started. The Italians on foot are still hanging behind considerably, only participating in the fight with their motorised artillery.
Around 13.00 hours at S.R.115 the impression rises temporarily that the enemy tanks advance to attack against the regiment. The tank hunters successfully take up the fight on the right, where the enemy is strongest. The still strongly occupied height before the right wing of the regiment is taken under effective fire by all heavy infantry weapons and the artillery which are in use.
Ahead of the 21.Pz.Div. rearward movements in the direction south-east and east are now recognised. Now elements of the vehicle column in front of the regiment also start to evade south-east, covered by artillery and with numerous tanks providing security. The own fire is, as far as is still possible, increased; the lack of ammunition of the artillery is unfortunately especially in this moment quite noticeably to our disadvantage.
Around 13.45 hours it becomes known that the attack of Group Vaerst has come to a halt in front of built-up positions, but that that the continuation of the attack has been ordered after regrouping. The sound of fighting to the south-west has considerably decreased at this time.
The attack by S.R.115 now continues to gain ground also on the right. The 30 to 40 enemy tanks still present on and in front of the height opposite the 1st battalion S.R.115 are however a considerable threat to the right flank of the battle group, which can be eliminated by an attack of Group Vaerst towards the east. On the request if a new task has been given to Group Vaerst, the corps orders continuation of the attack to Group Geissler, and informed that Group Vaerst stops for the moment.
Around 14.30 hours the Brigade CP, which advances in the sector of the S.R.115 recognises a rearward movement of the enemy tank agglomeration in front of Group Vaerst. This recognition is immediately passed on to Group Vaerst and also the the D.A.K.
The rifle regiment has by now taken the height in front of its right wing and continues to advance south-east. The Brigade CO now pushes the battle group to special speed. Again it appears as if several enemy tanks, despite the already started rearward movement, are turning against the own right flank. Tank rounds are hitting in the rows of the battle group; Group Vaerst, according to a radio report, also thinks it possible that the enemy tanks may turn away north. The immediately starting concentrated fire of all available AT guns makes this intent, should it have been present, impossible. The mass of the enemy tanks is now turning to rapid flight in south-easterly direction. The enemy vehicle columns have by now moved off further to the south. Artillery and tank hunters fire continuously into the retreating enemy; further tank kills are achieved.
The battle group has started the pursuit in south-easterly direction on a wide front. The enemy answers only with single batteries. Also Group Vaerst, to which a liaison officer has been sent, has again commenced the attack and pursues the fleeing enemy tanks, pushing past the right of the disputed height in the direction south-south-east.
The 21.Pz.Div. has made a wide move south and inflicted heavy losses on the fleeing enemy. The Italians are advancing quickly, but are hanging behind considerably since they are on foot. Only single Italian tanks and parts of the motorised artillery can follow the attack echeloned to the left rear.
Around 16.00 hours a group of 20 enemy tanks makes a temporary front again before the S.R.115 and fires into the pursuing battle group. The heavy fire of all immediately deployed AT guns forces it to turn away again soon. Additionally the threat of the Group Vaerst advancing on the right has become to big for the enemy. He turns to flight so quickly that touch with him is almost lost. The enemy artillery fire has now also almost completely stopped. Around 16.45 hours the forward elements of S.R.115 have reached the Uadi el Faregh. The location and the still available, sharply reduced fuel volumes, are reported to the D.A.K.
While Group Vaerst continues to pursue the evading enemy in rapid speed, the pursuit is stopped around 17.00 hours by order of the Brigade CO, after 21.Pz.Div has also come to a stop. The left battalion of S.R.115 has already crossed the Uadi with the tank hunters. After a Stuka attack into the fleeing enemy, the tank hunters shoot up another three enemy thanks; then the connection with the enemy is lost.
At 17.30 hours Group Vaerst also stops the pursuit. On request to the D.A.K. regarding the next steps the final stop of the attacks is ordered.
South of the Uadi el Faregh, a rifle platoon reinforced by AT guns is used for security. Both tank hunter companies assemble at the level of the Brigade CP according to orders to be at the disposition of the Brigade CO. The units of the battle group disperse widely, take up night positioning, and re-supply. After establishing contact with 21.Pz.Div. rest starts.
The closing report of Battle Group Geissler to the D.A.K. is sent at 18.30 hours, and reads:
“Up to the end of the attack enemy in fast retreat south and south-east. Battle group stopped at 169 left 3, to the left rear of Group Vaerst. 21.Pz.Div. about three km to left rear. Own forward security on skyline south of own location. Established so far 15 tanks killed, 12 POW made, five trucks captured. Enemy tank partially new type, apparently US production. Own losses only low.”
As follow-on it could be reported to D.A.K. 30 minutes later that according to the pioneers tasked with the total destruction of all killed enemy tanks the number of killed enemy tanks had increased to 26.
According to radio transmission from D.A.K. from 22.00 Battle Group Geissler was again subordinated to 15.Pz.Div. Connection was established immediately by liaison officer and radio.
The night passed quietly after this day which was such a success for our arms.
Geissler

The British side of this battle can be gleaned from the war diary entries of 28 Dec 41 the 22nd Royal Gloucestershire Hussars and 4th County of London Yeomanry, who were part of 22nd Armoured Brigade then. They are available at this link for 22nd RGH, scroll down to the bottom of the page and at this link for 4th CLY, scroll down again.

Some Italian Navy Reports

These are translations of reports from the Italian Navy's official history "La Difesa Del Trafico con L'Africa Settentrionale" (The Defense of the Traffic with North Africa - Volume I), which was published in the early 1960s as part of the 8-volume complete history of the Regia Marina in World War II. The translation was done by me - apologies for the possible errors. My Italian is far from perfect.

1. Documents relating to the emergency supply plan:

I. Exchange of letters between Admirals Weichold and Riccardi

LIAISON OFFICE OF THE GERMAN ADMIRAL AT THE ITALIAN NAVY

SECRET RESERVED TO THE ADDRESSEE

Translation N. 366/41 22 November 1941

To the Chief of the General Staff of the Royal Italian Navy, His Excellency Squadron Admiral Designated D’Armata RICCARDI

Following on from my verbal commication to the Deputy Chief the General Staff I have the honour to submit to Your Excellency, in the name of the Grand Admiral, the following:

The Grand Admiral begs you to take into consideration, regarding the current situation in North Africa, all possibilities for resupply of gasoline, ammunition, and anti-tank weapons for the Cyrenaica with light naval units and submarines, even if this requires to run risks with them that normally would not be appropriate. The lack of supplies can be of great importance for the joint conduct of the war and for the holding of the Italian colony.
WEICHOLD

SUPERMARINA 22 November 1941

To Admiral Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy in Italy, His Admiral WEICHOLD

Re: Traffic with North Africa

SECRET RESERVED TO THE ADDRESSEE

Responding to your letter n. 366/41 of today

I would like to ask you to assure the Grand Admiral that Supermarina sees the current situation in exactly the same manner as he expressed it in his letter. Already going beyond the most serious requirements and confronting risks of war and seafare that in other times it would not be justified to take, a light cruiser and three destroyers will soon be be made available for the transport to Benghazi of the German battalion which Your command is preparing. You also know, as you are constantly kept aware of all decisions of Supermarina, that the transport of gasoline will be expedited with all means at our disposal, including a light cruiser, as you know. Also and especially now in this difficult moment the perfect coincidence of the views of our two navies is manifest.
THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF RICCARDI

II. Regia Navale Emergency Supply Plan for North Africa of 4 December 1941

1. Submarines
One per day to Bardia or Derna
a. Fuel transport
Cagni (All with 140 tons fuel and 3 tons variable supplies.)
Saint Bon
Millo
Carraciolo
Micca (105 tons of fuel oil in submarine tanks , 70 tons various fuels in jerry cans, total 175 tons.)

b. Ration transport
Menotti 14 tons in pallets
Settimo 11 tons in pallets; (or for either submarine 20 tons of heavier rations)

2. Destroyers/destroyer escorts
One or two per day. Each destroyer could carry 95 tons of fuels, in 4,000 jerry cans and 140 barrels. Each escort destroyer could carry 65 tons of fuels in jerry cans and
barrels. Depot ship Bellona supplied from German Wachtfels at Patrasso and then ran to Suda escorted by Turbine, while Wachtfels remained at Patrasso.

a. For Benghazi running a shuttle service from Benghazi to Suda Bay.
i. First pair: Two destroyers Vivaldi (?), from Leros, then Suda Bay and Benghazi
ii. Second pair: Destroyer Pessagno from Leros, then Suda Bay and Benghazi
Destroyer Pigafetta from Taranto to Benghazi and then to Suda Bay
iii. Third pair: Two destroyers Da Recco and Usodimare from Naples to Benghazi, then to Suda Bay.
b. For Derna, running a shuttle service from Derna to Suda Bay.
i. Destroyer escort Orsa leaves Taranto for Derna and then Suda Bay.
ii. Destroyer escort Procione runs from Argostoli to Benghazi and then Suda Bay, thereafter shuttle between Derna and Suda Bay.
iii. Destroyer escort royer Orione runs from Brindisi to Derna and then Suda Bay.

3. Special vessels One or two per week for Benghazi depending on availability of the port.
a. MS Calitea from Brindisi to Benghazi, to leave only when the port at Benghazi was free. Estimated transport ability 1,000 tons of various materials.
b. German steamer Ankara from Taranto for Benghazi to leave when battleship
Duilio and the VIIth Division could escort it . Estimated transport ability 5,500 tons of various materials.

4. Cruisers (special traffic)
a. Cadorna – at Taranto to leave for Benghazi at date to be settled, coordinated with loading of MS Veniero and depending on weather conditions.
Freight:
• 325 tons of gasoline in jerry cans
• 100 tons of fuel oil in the cruiser’s bunkers
• 20 tons of rations • 10 tons of small arms ammunition
• 100 men
b. Da Barbiano Da Giussano – from Taranto to Palermo and on to Tripoli. Both cruisers depart at a date to be settled depending on the lunar phase.
Freight (each cruiser):
• About 300 tons of rations
• About 20 tons of ammunition for 88mm AA guns
• About 500 tons of fuel oil in the bunkers
• 120 men

2. Report by the Head of Escort Section Procida and Maritza convoy, Captain of Frigate Francesco Mimbelli

Extract from the report of Captain of Frigate Mimbelli regarding the engagement of Destroyer Escort Lupo on 24 November 1941

Left Out

b) The fire of the two Destroyer Escorts, considering the particularly difficult conditions under which it was conducted (frequent change of approach to avoid bracketing by the enemy; reduced visibility by smoke-screen; impossibility for Lupo to measure range etc.etc.), had a fairly satisfying result. As was already told, an Arethusa class cruiser was hit once or twice by Lupo. Previously, this same cruiser had already been hit by Cassiopea shortly before. In total 304 rounds of 100/47 were expended: 116 by Lupo and 188 by Cassiopea. Perfect in every regard the performance of the munitions and guns: not one dud round. Less well however was the performance of the smoke generators on the two Destroyer Escorts, which generated smoke alright, but not of the density and opaqueness that could have been wished for.

c) After sighting, the enemy tried to disturb our radio communications on the naval frequency (m.55) by emitting a constant signal for several minutes. This probably aimed to stop or blanket our signal of discovery, and to prevent indirectly the assembly of naval or air forces in our support. Despite the efforts by the enemy, our signal of discovery was promptly received by the radio station of Naval Command South East.

d) The tactical conduct of combat by the English was in my view based on not running risks. Instead of aiming for the complete destruction of the enemy forces, which would not have been difficult to achieve given the great disparity in forces and the measurable distance in speed, they contented themselves with only sinking the steamers in the care of the Destroyer Escorts, in a way that could not cause significant damage to their own units The enemy destroyers remained all the time rigidly close to the cruisers and did never attempt a gamble, even though their higher speed would have allowed them to. When the two Destroyer Escorts had to leave the field of action, they renounced to pursue, or at the least pursue as far as possible. The fire of the English was as always heavy, but I can not say I was favourably impressed by the precision and the speed. It must of course be said that a Destroyer Escort taking high-speed evasive actions is anything but a simple target.

e) For the part concerning the conduct of the action on our side, I maybe allowed to observe that I missed the information from aerial reconnaissance about the approach of the enemy forces. If I had known of the approach of the English division towards me just a few hours before, I could most likely have evaded contact until sunset, and then return quickly to the Morea coast. When sighting the enemy forces I quickly understood that the steamers were practically condemned: we missed two hours to sunset; there was no support group nearby; the coast was too far. Only one hope remained for me: that of an intervention by German bombers. It was above all that hope which made me look for delaying, for as long as possible, the approach march of the enemy units and the destructive effect of their fire on the steamers. I had to renounce twice to conduct the attack to the finish with Lupo because the enemy, free of any restriction to maneuver, by turning bow to me, immediately conducted the counter-maneuver that is at the same time easiest and most effective. When at 16.30 hours I saw that nothing could be done to rescue the Maritza and the Procida, and that remaining close to them would lead only to the loss of the two Destroyer Escorts, I decided to abandon the two steamers with their precious cargo and their brave crews. Never before have I had to take such a painful decision which is in such contrast, at least apparently, to that which should be the creed of every torpedo commander: aggressiveness. I had to shut up the sentiment and obey the cold reasoning which ordered me to save Lupo and Cassiopea for other endeavours.

CHIEF OF THE SQUADRON

Captain of Frigate FRANCESCO MIMBELLI

3. Exchange of letters between Supermarina and Naval Command Trapani on the loss of tanker Iridio Montavani

COMMAND OF NAVAL BASE TRAPANI

Trapani, 21 December 1941/XX Office O.A.

SUPERMARINA SECRET – RESERVED – PERSONAL

Re: Mission report escort battle with enemy and sinking of Royal Destroyer Da Mosto

In conjunction with dispatch no. 28861 dated 16th of the current month relating to the same affair.

While returning the mission report of the commander of Royal destroyer Da Mosto I would like to allow myself to present the following:
The losses we have suffered in the channel of Sicily in the last six month because of increased activity of enemy air forces are in my view due to imperfect air-sea co-operation. Leaving aside the reasons why this co-operation has thus far not been effective, it is a fact that the convoys, in particular those of one or two units with a naval escort, do not have aerial escorts for the whole daylight time, or don’t have it at all. This allows enemy air reconnaissance a lot of liberty and following that deadly attacks. It can also be observed that often the attacks happen when fighters are absent. Reiterating that the convoys, against which Malta is an effective air base, which can be seen at the moment, should not venture south of Pantelleria without aerial escort during the day, and can therefore not leave the final port of call in Italy before that escort is available and assured. 1. In the case we are looking at here, the attack at 13.00 hours, the fighters which were present from 10.40 hours, did not intervene. In the second attack at 16.50 hours, with the aerial escort absent, the attack could develop with only board weapons against it. 2. Finally the sighting of the two cruisers and the accompanying destroyer occurred just when, by fatal coincidence, the Da Mosto expected the Malocello and the Prestinari. Even this uncertainty could have been avoided had the aerial reconnaissance worked, and rapidly signaled the discovery. This would have allowed Da Mosto to be informed of the presence of enemy warships, and enabled her to make for Tripoli, only 60 miles away, avoiding a day-time battle without hope of success while having shipwrecked on board. Because of the situation created by the uncertainty, a retreat would almost certainly not have allowed to prevent the destruction of Da Mosto by the enemy force, and her commander therefore decided to take on the battle, leading his ship with determination and bold daring to her glorious end.

ADMIRAL OF DIVISION

Commander of the Naval Station

LUIGI NOTARBARTOLO

SUPERMARINA TO NAVAL STATION TRAPANI

Re: Mission report escort battle with enemy and sinking of Royal Destroyer Da Mosto

SECRET – RESERVED – PERSONAL

Referring to sheet 3/1716 S.R.P. dated 21 December 1941 – XX

Regarding the aerial escort of the Da Mosto convoy, this was assured for the whole duration of daylight. During the first attack of 13.00 hours the fighters, while present, did not intervene because they were not aware of the presence of enemy aircraft. While this is inconvenient, this has already been verified on other occasions, and continues to be verified until it is possible to have an adequate system of communication between ships and planes, since the visibility from the planes is limited, and the first spotting is always effected by the naval unit. During the second attack at 16.50 hours the fighters, while in flight, were not in the sky above the ships because the attacks happened during the change of escort, when the first patrol, at the limit of fuel, had turned away to return to base, while the second patrol had not yet arrived above the convoy.

CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF

SANSONETTI

The Crusader Project (What it is all about)

We are working on what will probably be the first single-volume, complete and focused history of the winter battle in North Africa 1941/42 from 18 November 41 to 6 February 42, known under the British operational name "Crusader". The project is based on German and Commonwealth records, a wealth of secondary works, including the British operational and intelligence, South African, New Zealand, and Italian official histories, unit histories, historical reports written post-war by German officers, and analysis of the war in desert by authors such as Field Marshal Michael Carver.

The book will cover the day-by-day progress of the battle on land and sea, and discuss the strategic setting, with a particular focus on the convoy battles between the Royal Navy and the Regia Marina and the intelligence situation for both sides.

Throughout the project, we will inform anyone interested here. We will also make files and information available that are unlikely to end up in the book, but will still be of interest to the general reader.

Andreas & Rich